> "it is ok to strip out my copyright string from my code"? How did they end up on that side?
The answer is, they didn't end up on that side. Copyright infringement does not involve merely using a copyrighted work. Copyright infringement involves copying part of a work's copyrightable expression into another Thing (for lack of a better word).
In the US, if no part of the Thing is substantially similar [1] to any part of the original work's expression, then the Thing does not infringe on the original work's copyright. The EFF's "side" is that in such cases, there is no categorical obligation to add/include copyright management information (CMI) of the original work to the Thing, and it makes no legal sense to argue that the CMI was "removed" from the Thing. Not every LLM output contains expression substantially similar to any particular copyrightable expression in the training set. Whether LLM output infringes copyright can be different on a case-by-case basis.
> "it is ok to strip out my copyright string from my code"?
No, if part of the output (whether human output or LLM output) is substantially similar to (even an obfuscated or mangled version of) the copyrightable expression in your code.
> While this effort has largely failed, applying "just cause" protections to these workers is the sort of workplace protection that usually attaches to more traditional employees. In other words, what progressives have not been able to achieve outright they're attempting to do in piecemeal fashion.
[...]
> It's unclear whether NYC will appeal the recent decision or instead accept that the law needs to be rewritten. A better idea would be to scrap the misguided idea entirely.
(Notwithstanding the other arguments in TFA), the author is arguing that so-called non-"traditional" workers don't need and thus might not deserve "just cause" protections. The author also frames "just cause" for non-"traditional" employees as a primarily progressive political objective.
> One of the hallmarks of the gig economy is flexibility. Drivers work when they please and often use multiple platforms, while the labor supply is ideally meant to fluctuate dynamically based on demand. Attaching more rules to driver deactivation inevitably raises labor costs as platforms are less able to weed out bad apples. In the end, the flexibility that drivers themselves most prize when it comes to gig work will be eroded, as companies respond to the regulations by potentially limiting the number of drivers they allow on the platform.
The supposed "flexibility" is usually Uber's flexibility at the expense of Uber drivers' flexibility [1]. Assuming that the drivers do "most prize" their flexibility, it would be easy to most prize one not quite good aspect of the job that is much better than the other aspects of the job. What's more, the premise is that everything that burdens gig companies with massive profits will (not is likely to, will) necessarily burden the drivers. If Uber/Lyft were to maliciously comply (I'm using the word "malicious" idiomatically [2]) with a just cause law by needlessly terminating or reducing the job quality of drivers whom wouldn't have been terminated before the existence of the law, the author would attribute most blame to the just cause law and not to Uber/Lyft.
> A companion "just cause" bill for food delivery drivers also recently passed in New York and was not opposed by gig platforms like Uber, likely because it lacked the onerous 14-day notice provision of the rideshare version.
> It's unclear whether NYC will appeal the recent decision or instead accept that the law needs to be rewritten. A better idea would be to scrap the misguided idea entirely.
If I seem to inappropriately attribute an anti-labor sentiment to the author that you believe isn't there, please take notice: The author is asking people to give up on the idea of making "just cause" laws for gig drivers. There's no rewritten version (not even a version similar to the other bill for food delivery drivers) that would be better than nothing, the author concludes.
As for my opinion, a better, safety-respecting just cause law for drivers might let companies immediately suspend the driver for just cause proceedings so long as the company provides some level of pay during the suspension period or sets up back pay.
Gift link [1]. But now the New York Times puts a login wall on gift links, so if you can't bypass it somehow I got the gift link from a related (not a substitute) article [2].
> the article author seems not to mind the controls if they are on manufactured gore or porn.
From what I've read of her blog, my interpretation is that Heather Burns opposes all government-mandated age verification (which most government-mandated age gates would require), but does not necessarily oppose all voluntary (on the part of the website) or socially-enforced age gates.
> not to mind the controls if they are on manufactured gore or porn.
Should we ignore the differing purposes of creating contextually inappropriate info and the differing purposes of sharing it? Is there a logical or moral contradiction in treating potentially inappropriate info created or shared by people for the purpose of pleasing or shocking (without urgency) other people with violent, disgusting, or sexually explicit material differently than we treat potentially inappropriate info shared or recorded (not the same as created) by people for the purpose of informing or shocking (into urgency) other people?
What's more in this case, 9/11 is one of the few events that some US middle schools (with students as young as 10 or 11) and high schools hold an annual moment of silence for. After "hearing" it twice, almost every student will understand that 9/11 is being singled out as a particularly important historical event. At least by the end of middle school age, children should have some room to voluntarily (on the part of the children) learn about the most disturbing aspects of 9/11.
The answer is, they didn't end up on that side. Copyright infringement does not involve merely using a copyrighted work. Copyright infringement involves copying part of a work's copyrightable expression into another Thing (for lack of a better word).
In the US, if no part of the Thing is substantially similar [1] to any part of the original work's expression, then the Thing does not infringe on the original work's copyright. The EFF's "side" is that in such cases, there is no categorical obligation to add/include copyright management information (CMI) of the original work to the Thing, and it makes no legal sense to argue that the CMI was "removed" from the Thing. Not every LLM output contains expression substantially similar to any particular copyrightable expression in the training set. Whether LLM output infringes copyright can be different on a case-by-case basis.
> "it is ok to strip out my copyright string from my code"?
No, if part of the output (whether human output or LLM output) is substantially similar to (even an obfuscated or mangled version of) the copyrightable expression in your code.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substantial_similarity
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